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Palestinian Unity Government:  
EU Should Find Ways to Cooperate 
Deborah Casalin & Brigitte Herremans 
Hamas  and  Fatah,  along  with  other 
Palestinian  factions  and  parties,  signed  a 
unity agreement on the 27th of April, with 
the aim of ending a four-year-long political 
division  of  the  occupied  Palestinian 
territory (oPt) between the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. The announcement of the 
deal came as a surprise as the reconciliation 
efforts  stalled  mid-2009,  when  Hamas 
refused to sign an agreement brokered by 
Egypt.  The  agreement,  involving  13 
Palestinian  factions  and  the  Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), is a result 
of  popular  pressure  and  a  first  step  to 
restore the democratic deficit in the oPt. It 
also  presents  the  international  community 
with a new opportunity to change the status 
quo.  Delivery  of  development  aid  to  the 
Gaza  Strip  could  become  far  less 
constrained.  Dealing  with  a  technocratic 
unity  government  could  also  be  an 
opportunity  to  push  Hamas  to  become  a 
responsible  political  player  and  respect 
international humanitarian law (IHL). 
The Need for Palestinian Unity 
Until  recently,  there  was  not  enough  political 
will to reach an agreement, as both parties were 
consolidating  their  power  in  their  respective 
spheres  of  interest.  Both  parties  were  not 
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willing  to  change  their  position  and  seemed 
interested  in  reconciliation  only  as  far  it  did 
not interfere with their decision-making. There 
were  also  some  major  obstacles  to 
reconciliation,  such  as  the  Palestinian 
Authority’s  security  cooperation  with  Israel 
and  Hamas’  refusal  to  renounce  violence. 
Furthermore, both parties had different views 
on the purpose and timing of a national unity 
government, with President Abbas pushing for 
a  national  unity  government  in  order  to 
prepare for elections in September, and Hamas 
opposing an interim government and elections 
in the absence of reconciliation.  
 
The  reconciliation  agreement  is  general  and 
focuses  on  technical  issues  such  as  the 
preparation  of  parliamentary  and  presidential 
elections,  leaving  many  details  open  for 
discussion.
1  It  seems  to  give  both  parties 
enough  scope  to  overcome  their  original 
objections.  Hamas  abandoned  its  condition 
that  it  will  only  accept  a  national  unity 
government  if  it  can  participate  in  it.  Fatah 
accepted  the  resumption  of  the  activities  of 
the  Palestinian  Legislative  Council ( P L C ) , 
which  is  dominated  by  Hamas.  Both  parties 
compromised on their unwillingness to share 
power. This will require a hitherto unknown 
discipline from both parties. Yet, both parties 
maintain  their  right  to  veto  decisions  of  the 
caretaker  government.  Hamas  is  also  in  the 
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safe  position  of  playing  inside  the  political 
arena without exposing itself to too much risk. 
The interim government will follow the line of 
the  PLO,  the  representative  body  of  the 
Palestinians that will also remain in charge of 
negotiations with Israel.
2  
 
Many observers contend that the main trigger 
for  the  renewed  reconciliation  talks  were  the 
Arab protests and the domestic response to this 
regional  push  for  democratic  representation. 
On 15 March, youth in the Gaza Strip and the 
West  Bank  took  to  the  streets,  demanding 
reconciliation. Neither Fatah nor Hamas could 
ignore  the  growing  domestic  pressure  for 
Palestinian  unity.  For  Hamas,  the  regional 
transformation seems positive, as is clear from 
the  decision  of  the  Egyptian  caretaker 
government to base its foreign policy more on 
Arab interests and to open the Rafah border 
crossing between Egypt and Gaza.
3 This might 
have allowed Hamas to forsake its reluctance to 
sign  the  agreement  that  it  refused  to  sign  in 
2009.  Even  if  it  is  the  same  agreement,  the 
context is different.
4 The Palestinian Authority 
(PA)’s  intention  to  unilaterally  declare  a 
Palestinian  state  in  the  General  Assembly  in 
September might also have had an impact on 
the timing of the unity deal.
5 
 
Both parties also realize that the division could 
harm their long-term interests. The geographic 
and political split between the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip is detrimental to the prospects 
for  a  Palestinian  state.  Fatah,  expelled  from 
Gaza  after  Hamas’  violent  takeover  in  June 
2007, wants to get a foothold in the Strip again. 
The PA, led by Fatah leader President Abbas, 
shifted  its  strategy  away  from  the  diplomatic 
process  under  the  aegis  of  the  US  to  the 
declaration of a Palestinian state at the General 
Assembly in September, and cannot afford to 
continue  its  state-building  efforts  without 
including  Gaza.  Hamas,  as  the  de  facto 
authority in Gaza, did manage to establish an 
administration  and  deliver  services,  despite 
international  isolation  and  Israel’s  blockade. 
Yet,  in  the  long  run,  this  situation  where 
Hamas has established an alternative model of 
governance,  is  untenable  and  undesirable  in 
terms  of  the  need  for  unity  of  the  future 
Palestinian state. Furthermore, Hamas’ rule is 
undermined by the challenge posed by other 
radical Islamist groups and the divisions within 
its own movement.  
 
However, the challenges to the reconciliation 
process are huge. The deal is skeletal and could 
unravel over some unresolved issues, such as 
the composition of the unity government, the 
choice of Prime Minister and the reform of the 
PLO,  in  which  Hamas  is  not  included.
6 
Domestically,  the  national  unity  government 
will  have  to  prepare  presidential  and 
parliamentary  elections  within  a  year.  Fatah 
and Hamas will be running against each other - 
this  competition  for  votes  might  undermine 
the  fragile  cooperation.  The  interim 
government will have to show tangible results 
and improve the situation in the oPt, especially 
in the Gaza Strip. The most challenging task 
for  the  reconciliation  committees  (newly 
established  under  the  unity  deal)  will  be  to 
work out a security arrangement between the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and integrate 
the militias, thus creating a monopoly on the 
use of force. 
 
Furthermore,  external  actors  might  spoil  the 
process.  Israel  strongly  opposes  a  national 
unity  government  and  announced  the 
suspension of peace talks. Even if it originally 
denounced  the  split,  it  has  an  interest  in 
maintaining  the  division  and  perpetuating  a 
policy  of  separation.  During  the  short-lived 
Palestinian unity government in 2007 (March-
June), the US actively promoted division. It is 
doubtful that the current administration will be 
positive towards a unity government and the 
prospect of PLO reform in order to include 
Hamas. The question is whether the EU will 
change  its  position,  taking  into  account  the 
new geostrategic situation in the region and the 
lessons of the failed isolation policies.    3 
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Towards a Different European Strategy 
The  EU  seems  more  favourable  towards 
reconciliation,  no  longer  adhering  to  the 
militarized  security  response  it  adopted  in 
2006.
7  Within  the  institutions,  many  officials 
believe  that  the  ‘no  contact  policy’  towards 
Hamas has failed.
8 The EU has also called for 
Palestinian  unity  under  President  Mahmoud 
Abbas.  Yet,  there  is  reticence  to  consider  a 
different strategy towards Hamas. Apart from a 
declaration by the High Representative Ashton, 
“interested  in  learning  more  about  the 
agreement”,  the  EU  did  not  officially  take  a 
position  on  the  interim  government.  Some 
member  states  did  refer  to  the  Quartet 
conditions  as  a  framework f o r  
engagement  with  a  national  unity 
government.  Observers  indicate, 
however, that it is crucial to distinguish 
between  engagement  with  a  unity 
government  and  engagement  with 
Hamas. Furthermore, in discussions on 
engagement  with  Hamas  as  such,  the 
Quartet principles could be seen as the 
end goal and not as the means. They should 
not  be  used  as  a  cover  to  defend  non-
engagement. It is vital that the EU seeks ways 
to  work  with  the  unity  government,  in  the 
interest of maintaining the viability of the two-
state solution by supporting the building of a 
unified  Palestinian  state  to  live  peacefully 
alongside Israel. Furthermore, in the interests 
of  ensuring  respect  for  international  law, 
engagement  with  the  unity  government  is  an 
opportunity  to  indirectly  exert  leverage  on 
Hamas to abide by IHL. Co-operation could be 
based upon furthering the following objectives: 
 
Stopping all Attacks against Civilians and 
Hostage-Taking 
The targeting of civilians and civilian objects, 
indiscriminate attacks which do not distinguish 
between  civilians  and  military  objectives,  and 
hostage-taking  are  all  forbidden  under  IHL.
9 
EU  member  states  have  the  duty  to  ensure 
respect  for  the  Geneva  Conventions  in  all 
circumstances, and where there is a failure to 
fulfil  obligations,  they  should  “endeavour  to 
bring the party responsible for violations back 
to an attitude of respect for the Convention.”
10 
Although the various parties and factions in the 
oPt  are  not  formally  parties  to  the  Geneva 
Conventions,  the  PLO  has  indicated  that  it 
considers  itself  bound  by  them,  and  in  any 
event,  customary  IHL  requires  all  states  to 
exert their influence as far as possible to end 
IHL violations, regardless of who is responsible 
for  them.
11 The EU has to use its influence on 
Hamas,  as  an  armed  group,  to  unilaterally 
commit itself to respect IHL and stop attacks 
against civilians, as well as release hostages and 
refrain from further hostage-taking.  
Gaza:  Ending  the  Blockade, F a c i l i t a t i n g  
Reconstruction and Development 
Owing  to  the  physical  West  Bank/Gaza 
separation exacerbated by the Israeli blockade, 
and  the  political  separation  caused  by  the 
Hamas-Fatah division, it was not possible for 
the  PA’s  previous  development  and  state-
building  plan  to  have  much  effect  in  Gaza. 
With  the  political  division  alleviated,  the  EU 
should  intensify  efforts  to  end  the  physical 
separation, in order to allow the extension of 
the West Bank’s development progress to Gaza 
as well. The most important means of ending 
the physical separation remains for the EU to 
exercise  leverage  on  Israel  through  bilateral 
relations to end the illegal blockade.  
 
In this regard, the opening of Rafah crossing, 
announced by Egypt, will not absolve Israel of 
its duty to end its blockade on Gaza, which is 
recognized  under  IHL  as  a  collective 
punishment  of  the  population,  and  impairs 
“It is vital that the EU seeks ways 
to work with the unity government, 
in the interest of maintaining the 
viability of the two-state solution”   4 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
their dignity and rights. It will also not relieve 
Israel of its responsibilities as occupying power, 
and  as  the  party  with  the  ability  to  restore 
Palestinians’  right  to  freedom  of  movement 
within their territory, i.e. between the West Bank 
and Gaza. However, the opening of Rafah, when 
implemented,  can  hopefully  provide  improved 
access to Gaza for reconstruction materials and 
greater possibilities for exports. This will enable 
a larger degree of reconstruction and recovery, 
as well as opening Gaza to greater opportunities 
for economic and social development. The EU 
could  help  to  facilitate  this  opening  and  build 
confidence in it by providing a presence at the 
crossing  to  ensure  access  and  security.  This 
move  would  require,  and  be  strengthened  by, 
coordination  with  the  Palestinian  unity 
government. 
 
Ending Human Rights Violations Committed 
by Palestinian Security Forces 
Human  rights  violations  by  security  forces, 
particularly torture, arbitrary detention and the 
repression  of  freedom  of  peaceful  assembly, 
have been a cause for serious concern in the oPt. 
Many  such  violations  have  reportedly  been 
fuelled  by  the  internal  political  division  – f o r  
example, the dispersing of assemblies which are 
seen as affiliated to the opposing party, and the 
numerous “political detentions” reported every 
month  to  the  Independent  Commission  on 
Human  Rights.
12  A  national  unity  government 
presents an opportunity to remove one of the 
root causes of violations, i.e. opposing factions’ 
repression  of  each  others’  activities.  The  EU 
would also be able to extend to Gaza its existing 
efforts to curtail security force abuses. 
 
Organization of Palestinian Elections 
Palestinian elections, which are long overdue, are 
planned  for  next  year.  They  will  allow 
Palestinians to exercise their right to vote and to 
take part in public affairs through their elected 
representatives. More than a vote is at stake – 
the EU has recognized that the postponement 
of  elections  is  impeding  the  promotion  of 
democratic governance, and that the suspension 
of  the  PLC  (owing  to  the  West  Bank-Gaza 
split)  is  holding  back  legislation  which  is 
required to implement reforms, particularly in 
the justice sector.
13 Elections are therefore one 
major key to ensuring the rule of law, which 
has  been  a  focus  of  the  EU-aided  state-
building  process.  Currently,  there  is  no 
functioning  legislature  to  enact  necessary 
reform  measures  through  a  democratic 
mandate,  and  elections  are  the  only  way  to 
change this situation. 
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